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USE OF TAX BENEFIT PRINCIPLES TO OVERRIDE SECTION 337:
D. B. ANDERS V. COMMISSIONER
Normally, gain realized from the. sale of assets pursuant to a
liquidation under section 337 is not recognized to the corporation.' In
D. B. Anders v. Commissioner, however, the taxpayer was required to
recognize gain received from the sale of previously expensed assets
during the liquidation period, through the application of tax benefit
principles,8 to override the express wording of section 337.
In Anders, an industrial laundry rental service sold previously
expensed rental items consisting of laundered apparels, coveralls, towels,
and other materials as part of its liquidation sale and claimed that section
337 precluded recognition of the gain on such items to the corporation.
Agreeing with the taxpayer, the tax court' held that the rental items
were "property" within the definition of section 337(b) (1)' and that
section 337 explicitly requires that gain received on the sale of such items
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 337(a):
(a) GENmzAL RL-If-..
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June
22, 1954, and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of
such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete
liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims,
then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation from the sale or
exchange by it of property within such 12-month period.
2. 48 T.C. 815, 24 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 69-5133 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
U.S. - (1969) (hereinafter Anders).
3. The recovery of an amount previously deducted from gross income which
resulted in a tax benefit at the time of deduction, is taxable in the year of recovery. Lake
View Trust & Savings Bank, 27 B.T.A. 290 (1932) ; Helvering v. State Planters Bank
& Trust Co., 130 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1942). For a discussion of tax benefit principles
see Note, The Ta Benefit, Recoveries, and Sales of Property Under Section 337, 9
WIIAM AND MARY L. REv. 476 (1968).
4. 48 T.C. 815 (1967).
5. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 337(b) (1):
(b) PROPERTY DEFINED.-
(1) IN GENmAL.-For purposes of subsection (a), the term "property"
does not include-
(A)stock in trade of the corporation or other propery of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the corporaton if on hand at the
close of the taxable year, and property held by the corporation primarily for
sale to customers in the oridinary course of its trade or business,
(B) installment obligations acquired in respect of the sale or exchange
(without regard to whether such sale or exchange occurred before, on, or
after the date of the adoption of the plan referred to in subsection (a) of stock
in trade or other property described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and
(C) installment obligations acquired in respect of property (other than
property described in subparagraph (A)) sold or exchanged before the date
of the adoption of such plan of liquidation.
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shall not be recognized to the corporation.6 The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals" reversed, stating merely that there was no provision in the Code
which bars the application of tax benefit principles to cases arising under
section 337.8
APPLICATION OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME, PROPER
ACCOUNTING, AND TAX BENEFIT PRINCIPLES TO CASES
ARISING UNDER SECTION 337
In seeking the nonrecognition protection of section 337, the tax-
payer in Anders asserted that its express language prohibited recognition
of gain to the corporation on the sale of "property" within the liquidation
period. However, the Commissioner has successfully employed several
theories to reach gains resulting from the sale of such property pursuant
to section 337. By requiring a change in the accounting method of a
cash basis taxpayer, the Commissioner reached gain realized from the
liquidation sale of contracts on which the income had been earned, but not
collected.9 The Commissioner has also prevailed on "assignment of
income" principles, as for example where a liquidating taxpayer sold
assets consisting of earned, but uncollected income." Similarly, a trans-
action in which the taxpayer attempted to dispose of assets representing
accured interest on note obligations, was characterized by the Com-
missioner as a mere collection of accrued interest, and not a sale or
exchange as required by section 337." Thus recognition of the income to
the corporation resulted. 2 In two other cases," a sale of receivables at
6. See note 1 supra.
7. 24 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 69-1533 (10th Cir. 1969).
8. Two other cases raising similar problems have succeeded Anders into the
courts. In Spitalny v. U.S., 288 F. Supp. 650 (1968), decided prior to the Tenth
Circuit reversal of Anders, the court relied upon the tax court decision in Anders in
holding that section 337 precluded the recognition of gain to the corporation resulting
from the sale of previously expensed cattle feed and supplies during the liquidation
period. In a case decided subsequent to the Tenth Circuit's reversal of Anders, however,
the court in Connery v. U.S., 24 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 69-5510 (1969), found the gain re-
ceived from the sale of previously expensed prepaid advertising taxable to the corporation.
9. Comm'r v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); Family Record Plan
Inc. v. Comnm'r, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 378 U.S. 910 (1963).
See INT. Ray. CODE of 1954 § 446(b).
10. Pridemark, Inc. v. Comm'r, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965). The assignment of
income principle is a common law theory which seeks to assure that income is taxed to
the individual who earned it.
11. See note 1 supra.
12. Central Building and Loan Assoc. v. Comm'r, 34 T.C. 447 (1960). This hold-
ing has been criticized, however, since a sale was obviously effected, and the result could
have been determined on proper accounting or assignment of income principles. See
Lyon, Ordinary Income May Arise in Section 337 Sales Under Assignment of
Income Doctrine, 16 J. TAX. 2 (1962); Gutkin and Beck, Section 337: IRS Wrong
in Taxing, At Time of Liquidation, Items Previously Deducted, 17 J. TAx. 146 (1962).
13. West Seattle Nat'l Bank of Seattle v. Conm'r, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961);
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face value, which had previously been deducted as bad debts, was designat-
ed a recovery and thus outside the nonrecognition protection afforded
gains"' under section 337.5
With the exception of Pridemark, the courts in each of the cases
cited above did not discuss the meaning of the word "property" in
section 337 nor did they determine in each case, whether the item sold
was actually section 337 "property."' 6 As a result of this omission it
remains unclear whether the courts realized that common law tax princi-
ples were employed to override the express language of section 337.
It has been suggested 7 that the definition of "property" in section
337 was taken from section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939,8 thereby restricting the meaning of "property" in section 337
so as to include only those assets which, if held for six months, would
qualify for capital gains treatment. 9 However, in view of the fact that
section 337 prescribes the nonrecognition of gains or losses for a bulk
sale of inventory, as well as for certain installment obligations, the
provision can not be confined to capital assets.2" Moreover, the Income
Tax Regulations extend the definition of "property," with certain ex-
ceptions," to "all assets owned by a corporation,"22 and thus, restricting
section 337 protection to capital assets alone would be improper.
In allowing the gain in Anders to go unrecognized, the tax court
distinguished the cases cited above which avoided section 337 non-
recognition, as involving sales of receivable income rather than assets.2"
But the cases distinguished concerned sales of the right to receive income,
which is an asset in the same way that an account receivable is an asset.
Both the tax court in Anders and the courts which decided the receivable
Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. of Cleveland v. U.S., 290 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl.
1061).
14. See note 1 supra.
15. But these two decisions were grounded on the codified tax benefit rule, INT.
REv. CODE Of 1954, § 111. The codified tax benefit rule deals specifically with the
exclusion from gross income of recoveries of prior deductions which produced no tax
benefit. However, section 111 1has been interpreted in these two cases to provide by
implication that recoveries of deducted amounts are taxable if a tax benefit was pre-
viously realized.
16. See Note, Section 337 "Property"--Trading In Stocks During Liquidation,
17 STANFoRn L. Rnv. 970 (1964-5).
17. Pridemark Inc. v. Comm'r, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965); Note, Tax-Free
Sales In Liquidation Under Section 337, 76 HARv. L. REv. 793 (1963).
18. INT. REV. CODE Of 1939, ch. 1, § 117, 53 Stat. 50.
19. The successor of § 117 in the INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954 is § 1221.
20. B. BITTKER AND - EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, § 9.65, (2d ed. 1966).
21. See Treas. Reg. § 1.337-3(a).
22. Id.
23. 48 T.C. at 823 (1967). See notes 9, 10, 12, 13 supra.
415
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
income cases failed to recognize that the former group of cases involved
the sale of assets within the meaning of "property" in section 337. If
the tax court meant to operate within the framework of prior case law in
which assignment of income,24 proper accounting,25 and tax benefit
principles26 were used to avoid the express language of section 337, gain
received upon the sale of the assets in Anders should have been recognized
to the corporation through application of the tax benefit rule.
Another distinction mentioned by the tax court between the right-
to-receive-income cases and Anders, was that in Anders the sale con-
sisted of operating assets. Since the Income Tax Regulations" define
"property" in section 337 to mean "assets," the operating asset distinc-
tion should be discarded as an unwarranted restriction on the coverage of
section 337. The nature of the asset sold is not a valid basis of distinction
in sales involving section 337. An asset is an asset, whether it consists
of previously expensed laundry rental items or receivable income. Further,
Connery v. U.S."8 shows that the operating assets distinction has not
proved to be viable. In Connery, the court relied upon the circuit court
decision of Anders in holding that the gain received on the sale during
liquidation of previously expensed prepaid advertising29 should be tax-
able to the corporation. Previously expensed prepaid advertising is
neither an operating asset, nor does it represent receivable income. It is
rather a marketing expense which is deducted from earned income of the
corporation. Connery is similar to Anders in that both cases concerned
the sale of items which represented prior deductions from ordinary
income, thus, equal treatment of the two situations would seem appropri-
ate. But if nonrecognition under section 337 is allowed to turn on the
operating asset distinction as suggested by the tax court in Anders, the
results in these two similar cases would be inconsistent, since Connery
did not involve the sale of operating assets.
It should also be noted that the sale in Connery parallels the right-to-
receive-income cases. In both situations sales proceeds represented cor-
porate income. In substance, the cases dealing with rights to receive
income, and those involving the sale of previously expensed items are the
same. It is immaterial that the former set of cases consisted of a sale of
items which should have been included in corporate income, while the
24. See note 10 supra.
25. See note 9 supra.
26. See note 13 supra.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-3 (a).
28. 24 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 69-5510 (1969).
29. In Connery, the entire cost of the prepaid advertising was charged to an
expense account upon purchase.
D. B. ANDERS v. COMMISSIONER
latter situations deal with the sale of items the cost of which was deducted
from corporate income. The effect on the corporation's income is the same
in both cases and the tax consequences should be consistent. The resulting
similarity in effect on corporate income renders the formal distinctions
made by the tax court in Anders difficult to sustain, and accordingly tax
benefit principles should have been employed to find the proceeds from
the sale of the expensed rental items taxable to the corporation.
Similarity between the receivable income cases and the expense
situations suggests a functional identity between the proper accounting,
assignment of income, and tax benefit principles. All three rules are
instrumental in assuring that ordinary gain is taxed to the taxpayer
earning the income. The tax court in Anders inaccurately distinguished
the receivable income decisions which were grounded on assignment of in-
come and proper accounting principles from the expense situation where
the tax benefit rule is apposite. Aside from the interconnectedness of the
three doctrines, however, the question remains whether, in any case, it is
legitimate to employ them to override the express wording of section 337.
JUSTIFICATION FOR OVERRIDING SECTION 337
While the Code explicitly excludes certain types of assets from the
definition of property protected by section 337, such as stock in trade or
installment obligations,"0 it has been suggested that exceptions other than
those specifically enumerated in section 337(b) (1) may exist." Since
nonrecognition of gain in Anders would create a tax benefit to the
taxpayer similar to that which would arise if the items excluded in
section 337(b) (1) were not excluded, the result reached by the circuit
court in Anders seems to be consistent with the purposes of that section,
as well as with tax benefit principles. While this argument is an expedient
way of reaching the Anders result under section 337, it does not provide
a rule which would encompass similar situations under the closely related
section 336,3" because the definition of property is not restricted in
30. See note 5 supra.
31. See note 16 supra. The use of the language "'Property' does not include'
permits an inference that exceptions to the scope of the meaning of "property" are not
limited to those specifically mentioned in § 337(b) (1). The word "includes" is defined
in § 7701(b) as being not sufficient to exclude other things within the meaning of the
term being defined through the use of "includes." By negative inference the phrase
"does not include" may be interpreted to mean that other exceptions to the meaning of
"property" in § 337 may exist.
32. INT. REV. Coon of 1954, § 336:
Except as provided in section 453(d) (relating to disposition of in-
stallment obligations), no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation
on the distribution of property in partial or complete liquidation.
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section 336 as it is in section 337." Since assignment of income principles
have been applied to section 336 cases, 4 another means must be found
which justifies the use of assignment of income, proper accounting, and
tax benefit principles to override the express language of sections 336
and 337.
In Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., the Supreme Court employed
assignment of income principles to override the express wording of a
provision in the Code. The taxpayer in P.G. Lake assigned its president
an oil payment right in exchange for the cancellation of a debt. The
taxpayer claimed the transaction was a sale of property (an interest in
land) producing a profit taxable as long-term capital gain under section
117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.6 The Supreme Court,
however, ruled that the assignment of income doctrine was not to be
limited by the express language of section 117, and that gain on the
transaction should be treated as ordinary income.
Both the assignment of income doctrine and tax benefit principles
serve to assure that gain is taxable to the appropriate taxpayer at the time
it is realized. By analogy to P.G. Lake section 337 should not be construed
to prohibit the application of tax benefit principles to situations similar
to that in Anders. It would be inconsistent, indeed, to hold that the
assignment of income doctrine may not be restricted as in P.G. Lake,
while holding, as did the tax court in Anders, that tax benefit principles
could be so limited.
Furthermore, the decision in P.G. Lake has been read as an expres-
sion of general opposition to the "conversion" 7 of ordinary income into
capital gain. Yet, the tax court in Anders apparently would sanction such
a conversion. 8
In allowing the taxpayer a windfall gain, the tax court in Anders
relied upon Comm'r v. South Lake Farms, Inc. 9 for the proposition that
the literal meaning of section 337 must be followed even though it
inadequately expressed the will of Congress.4" In South Lake, it was
held that the fair market value of an unharvested crop, planted and
33. See note 5 supra.
34. See Williamson v. U.S., 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. CI. 1961).
35. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
36. Currently § 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
37. Lyon and Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the
P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAx L. REv. 293, at 421 (1961-62).
38. If the taxpayer were awarded the benefit of the nonrecognition provisions of
§ 337, the usual double taxation of corporate income would be avoided. Hence, the
conversion is effected by the reduced taxation on the gain received from the sale of
the rental items.
39. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
40. 48 T.C. at 823 (1967).
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cultivated by the liquidating corporation, but harvested by a new cor-
poration which acquired all the stock 1 of the liquidating concern, was
not includable in the latter's final tax return, nor was the Commissioner
allowed to recoup deductions taken by the old corporation for the expense.
of preparing the crop for harvest. The money, representing the recovered
expenses in South Lake, by-passed the corporation and was part of the
purchase price received by the stockholders for their stock. Clearly,
South Lake parallels Anders. The stockholders in both instances received
a sum which represented ordinary gain to the corporation. In both cases,
it was the corporation which received the benefit of a prior deduction.
The tax court's reliance on South Lake was proper. The circuit court
opinion cannot be bolstered by distinguishing the case away. Accordingly
it must be concluded that adoption of the circuit court's rationale would
seriously undermine the continued validity of the Ninth Circuit's holding
in South Lake.
COMPARISON TO DEPRECIATION SITUATION
A secondary argument of the taxpayer in Anders was that the gain
on rental items resulted from a sale of the materials for an amount above
their depreciated basis. The petitioner maintained that expensing the
rental items in the year purchased was substantively similar to depreciat-
ing them on the basis of a one year useful life. The taxpayer then relied
on Fribourg Navigation Co., Inc. v. Comm'r42 which held that gain
from the sale of an asset above its depreciated basis is not subject to
recapture.
In Fribourg, the taxpayer depreciated a Liberty ship for two years
on the straightline method before selling it for an amount above the
original purchase price. The value of the ship was enhanced due to the
closing of the Suez Canal in 1958. The Supreme Court held that the sale
of a depreciable asset above its adjusted basis at the beginning of the
year of sale does not bar the depreciation deduction for that year.
Depreciation in Fribourg and expensing in Anders are parallel. But,
the external factors in each case which intervened to disrupt the normal
pattern differed. In Fribourg there was a change in market value while
in Anders liquidation occurred.
In Fribourg, the Court emphasized that the Income Tax Regula-
tions43 did not permit a redetermination of deductions for depreciation
41. INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 334. Section 334 concerns liquidations effected
through the sale of all the corporation's capital stock.
42. 383 U.S. 272 (1966).
43. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-1 (a) and 1.167(a)-1 (c).
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merely because of market fluctuations." However, in Anders there did
not exist any similar provision which would preclude the application of
tax benefit principles to liquidations under section 337.
Perhaps in discussing Fribourg the appropriate question to ask is
what result the Supreme Court would have reached had there not been a
regulation which precluded the Commissioner's recovery. The court might
well have reached the same conclusion as did the Tenth Circuit in Anders.
JAMES J. WILSON
44. 383 U.S. at 278 (1966).
